Coastwatchers
Summary of the locations of Coast Watcher Schools
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From June to December 1944, the first coast watcher school taught Chinese operatives on an island in the Min (still Min) River, ten miles upstream from Foochow (now Fuzhou)
[lat. 26-04, long. 119-20], Fukien (now Fujian) Province. -
In January1945 the coast watcher school for Americans was established 120 miles northwest of Foochow at Kienyang (now Jianyang) [lat. 27-20, long. 118-07], Fukien Province.
In June, 1944, SACO’s first coastal intelligence school was set up in a small temple that completely
filled an island no bigger than a ship in the Min River, ten miles upstream from Foochow, Fukien
Province. There was electricity nearby and a handy godown at the river bank; the monks were happy
to leave for a small monthly retainer. Commodore Miles chose the island at first sight; not only was
it far enough from town to be relatively safe but it was so exposed and open that no one would
suspect that the occupants had anything to hide.
Lieutenants Merrill Stewart and “Si” (pronounced sigh) Morris took up residence immediately and
planned the SACO coastal intelligence program. The coast from Shanghai to Hong Kong, more than
800 miles with many bays and islands, was divided into five intelligence divisions, or nets.
The Lieutenants also designed the program for, and then taught the first class of, coast watcher
school. The curriculum included ship-and-plane recognition, aerology, radio operation, and radio
repair. By December, 1944, one hundred Chinese coast watchers had been trained and deployed; at
that time the Foochow school closed. Additional Chinese coast watchers then were trained at almost
all of the SACO Camps.
In January, 1945 Lieutenants William R. Simpson and Joseph A. Meyertholen were sent to
Kienyang, 120 miles northwest of Foochow, to start a school for U.S. navy coast watchers. The men
were trained in map and chart reading, coding, radio operation and repair, weather observation,
aerology, and intelligence work. The course work for the recognition of ships and planes included
the Navy Renshaw system of flashing slides and the JAN (Joint Army-Navy) Number Three method
of Japanese ship identification.
The coast watchers reported on ship and planes sightings, downed airmen, weather, troop
movements, and other enemy activities. This information went to their net headquarters or to other
nets when needed.
Each coast watcher net contained five to a dozen Chinese observers equipped with small radios
which were not activated except in extremely important situations. The Japanese were on constant
lookout for “spy” radio transmissions and often the observer had to move after each radio use. Many
reports were sent by runners who sometimes traveled days to reach their headquarters.
The Americans had to learn to blend in while working in the often-exposed coastal sites. They
worked hard to look Chinese. They sunbathed and took Atabrine dailyso that their skin looked more
yellow than white. Also the Americans wore Chinese clothes and grass sandals, sat on their heels
to eat, and walked with the jouncy cadence common to the Chinese with their springy yo-yo poles.
Throughout the war only three Americans from SACO were taken prisoner by the Japanese; all were
coast watchers. Radioman 2nd Class Alfred W. Parsons was captured December 21, 1944; RM2c
Joseph Sexton and GM1c Leone Russomanno, July 16, 1945.
Coast Watcher Net #1, the furthest north net, covered the Shanghai area. Lieutenant Hilton Jayne
controlled Net #1 from Camp One near Hweichow (now Huicheng), Anhwei (now Anhui) Province.
Only all-Chinese teams worked this area; Gen. Tai Li worried that the Japanese presence was so
active that an American could not operate there without being captured.
Net #2 covered about 300 miles of coast including Hangchow (now Hangzhou) and Wenchow (now
Wenzhou). In January 1945, LT William Simpson went to Haimen (still Haimen), about 60 miles
northeast of Wenchow, to take charge of Net #2. Later this net was controlled from Camp Eight in
Yuhu (still Yuhu), 35 miles west-southwest of Wenchow.
Net #3 covered 150 miles of coast around Foochow. It was controlled from Camp Seven at Tung
Feng (now Dongfeng), Fukien Province and commanded by LT James T. Nelson.
Net #4 was directed from the Camp Six Intelligence facility at Changchow (now Zhangzhou). This
was the first net to be staffed with Americans; LT Carl Divelbiss was the first commander. Net #4
watched about 120 miles of coast southward from Huian (now Hui’an) to the area 50 miles
southwest of Amoy (now Xiamen). Of special interest was the harbor of Amoy, located on the west
side of the island; “one of the very best harbors on the coast of China.” (Miles, 1967, p 67).
Net #5 covered the approximately 350 miles of coast from 80 miles northeast of Swatow (now
Shantou) to Hong Kong as well as 60 miles up the Pearl River to Canton (now Guangzhou).
Lieutenant Robert Price was the commander and operated out of Meihsien (now Meixian),
Kwangtung (now Guangdong) Province. Meihsien was 75 miles north-northwest of Swatow.
Technical Sargent William M. Stewart (USMC) was the first American to serve alone as a coast
watcher. In the beginning of September, 1944, he occupied Sungsue Point overlooking Amoy.
During his second week he located a Japanese destroyer at anchor. This target was reported to
Chungking and forwarded to the Fleet which immediately sent three bombers. Stewart not only
directed the pilots to the destroyer, which was camouflaged as trees and not visible from the air, but
also to a small freighter, fuel dumps, and an airfield.
The Sergeant moved to nearby Ping-hai, which overlooked two bays shallow enough that Japanese
ships felt protected from submarines. On January 23, 1945 he observed 11 ships at anchor and sent
a few of Chang Yee-chow’s pirates onboard for information; they reported time of departure,
destination, and expected speed – eight knots since one ship was damaged. This information went
to Chungking and then to the nearest U.S. submarine, the U.S.S. Barb, the captain of which made
a daring surface attack the next morning at 4 AM and sank seven ships, three of which were
destroyers, and damaged one destroyer. Radio traffic normally was coded but TSgt Stewart
complained, in the clear, that the attack was too early and it was too dark to take pictures.
An unused temple and pagoda on top of Nan Tai Mountain, 1,852 feet above sea level, was a
navigational landmark for the 14th and Navy air forces as well as an exceptional location for coast
watching. The peak often was cloud covered but when clear offered unimpeded views of Amoy as
well as the islands of Quemoy (now Kinmen) and Little Quemoy. Feral man-eating tigers roamed
the forest below; the SACO men rarely left and then only during daylight. The Japanese did not
brave the natural defenses by foot but eventually shot off the top two stories of the pagoda with sixand
eight-inch shells. The Americans were impressed with the accurate gunsmanship; they had
abandoned ship just before the attack and received no casualties.
Coast watcher Nets #4 and #5 reported movements of 61 Japanese ships during the last two weeks
of January and 92 during the first two weeks of February, 1945. These were ships traveling along
the coast but not within Amoy Harbor.
At Camp Three a group of 28 Americans and 28 Chinese were trained to be coast watchers for the
area north of Shanghai. These courses started in Mid April, 1945; the war ended before the men
could be deployed.
During one of my earliest conversations with General Tai we had discussed the
aid his widespread organization could give downed airplane pilots and crewmen as
well as escaped prisoners, and by now we had a remarkable organization.
Instructions had gone to all village officials and even to the pirates and fishermen
with whom we were working. They were told to assist all downed airmen and
escaping prisoners, protecting them from the Japanese and leading them to
General Tai’s guerrillas or to others who were responsible to him. In October 1944
we even collected twenty-five million Chinese dollars in bills that would be
acceptable along the coast, and money from this hoard was already being carried
in the “ditching packs” of our Fleet aviators.
(Miles, 1967, p 322)
Air Ground Aid Service (AGAS) was a U.S. federal agency which had been organized during the
initial stages of the war for the purpose of rescuing downed fliers.
Lieutenant Richard C. Scott was the first SACO man to be sent to AGAS. From
his area around Nanking and, later, Foochow, sixty-seven downed Army and Navy
airmen were rescued before the end of the war. Many of these were brought in by
our “loyal pirates,” and Scott was so good at this job that we never got him back.
(Miles, 1967, p 323)
By the summer of 1945 fifteen SACO officers were working for AGAS. Some went to the
Philippines and Okinawa to explain to the Navy pilots that the China coast was not solidly held by
the Japanese. The fliers should head for the hills if they bailed out over the land. In the case of ocean
ditchings, south of Shanghai almost all fishermen were “friendly pirates” but to the north of the city the fishermen were less likely to be loyal.
During 1945 the coast camps picked up about twenty-five fliers, many of whom had first fallen into
the hands of these pirate fishermen. Most men divulged nothing that could hurt their Chinese
rescuers or hosts. Unfortunately, one well-known sports figure could not resist the urge to write
about of his daring rescue; the Japanese read the story and executed all who had helped.
We recommended a decoration for Lieutenant Frank Balsey, another A.C.I,
officer, who walked a thousand miles while helping twenty downed Army and Navy
pilots escape in the Hangchow Bay area, and who personally rescued three pilots
from behind the Japanese lines. Furthermore, in June 1945, he came across the
remains of a Japanese plane of the type we called an “Emily” and sent in a report
about it. U. S. Navy airmen had attacked the plane and damaged it, but it had
escaped only to crash in China. But when Balsey found it he discovered that in
addition to the plane’s crew, a Japanese vice admiral and a group of other naval
officers had died in the crash.
(Miles, 1967, p 323)
South of Hong Kong, Capt. Robert Meynier, of the French Navy, and his wife, an Annamite
Princess, organized the city and port officials, lighthouse keepers, customs officers along the coast
of northern Indo-China (now Vietnam) into an intelligence network. Even after the departure of the
Meyniers in mid 1944 this net supplied SACO with a wide variety of intelligence about weather,
shipping, and Japanese troop movements.
Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., queried SACO-Chungking for targets in Indo-Chinese waters. The
Indo-Chinese coast watcher net radioed Chungking with a list of ships in Camranh Bay, Saigon, and
other ports under Japanese control. One lighthouse keeper reported courseand speed of a twenty-sixship
convoy he had seen that morning. The reply to Fleet was so extensive and detailed that on
January 11, 1945, bombers sank 40 ships for a total of 120,006 tons; among them were a Japanese
cruiser and 11 other naval craft.
. . . Admiral Halsey . . . told me later that it was embarrassing, in a way. With so
much information on which to work, he was compelled, to change many of his
designations. As it was, he detailed just enough planes for each target and as a
result he managed to “cover the waterfront.”
(Miles, 1967, p 424)
The coast watchers, with no more than cheap box cameras and pre-war film, snapped photos of ships
burning or sinking as well as destroyed supply dumps.
Cited reference:
Miles, M. E., 1967, A Different Kind of War: Doubleday & Co, Garden City, NY. 629 p.
Charles H. Miles, Ph.D.
July 25, 2021